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Abstract. We introduce Celebrity games, a new model of network cre-
ation games. In this model players have weights (being W the sum of
all the player’s weights) and there is a critical distance β as well as a
link cost α. The cost incurred by a player depends on the cost of es-
tablishing links to other players and on the sum of the weights of those
players that remain farther than the critical distance. Intuitively, the aim
of any player is to be relatively close (at a distance less than β) from the
rest of players, mainly of those having high weights. The main features
of celebrity games are that: computing the best response of a player is
NP-hard if β > 1 and polynomial time solvable otherwise; they always
have a pure Nash equilibrium; the family of celebrity games having a
connected Nash equilibrium is characterized (the so called star celebrity
games) and bounds on the diameter of the resulting equilibrium graphs
are given; a special case of star celebrity games share its set of Nash equi-
librium profiles with the MaxBD games with uniform bounded distance
β intoduced in [6]. Moreover, we analyze the Price of Anarchy (PoA)
and of Stability (PoS) of celebrity games and give several bounds. These
are that: for non-star celebrity games PoA = PoS = max{1,W/α}; for
star celebrity games PoS = 1 and PoA = O(min{n/β,Wα}) but if the
Nash Equilibrium is a tree then the PoA is O(1); finally, when β = 1 the
PoA is at most 2. The upper bounds on the PoA are complemented with
some lower bounds for β = 2.
1 Introduction
The global growth of Internet and social networks usage has been accompanied
by an increasing interest to model theoretically their creation as well as their
behavior. In particular, network creation games (NCG) aim to model Social
Networks and Internet by simulating the creation of a decentralized and non-
cooperative communication network among n players (the network nodes).
From the seminal paper [14] several proposals have been made in the area of
NCG. In the original model, the goal of each player is to have, in the resulting
network, all the other nodes as close as possible while buying as few links as
possible [14]. Several assumptions are made: all the players have the same inter-
est (all-to-all communication pattern with identical weights); the cost of being
disconnected is infinite; and the edges paid by one node can be used by others.
Formally, a game Γ in this model is defined as a tuple Γ = 〈V, α〉, where V is the
set of n nodes and α the cost of establishing a link. A strategy for player u ∈ V
is a subset Su ⊆ V − {u}, the set of players for which player u pays for estab-
lishing a link. The n players and their joint strategy choices S = (Su)u∈V create
an undirected graph G[S]. The cost function for each node u under strategy S
is defined by cu(S) = α|Su|+
∑
v∈V dG[s](u, v) where dG[s](u, v) is the distance
between nodes u and v in graph G[S]. Because of the summation in the cost
function this model is informally known as the Sum game model. By changing
the cost function to cu(S) = α|su|+max{dG[S](u, v)|v ∈ V } as proposed in [12]
one obtains the Max game model.
From here on several versions and variants have been considered. Instead of
buying links unilaterally, [9] proposed the possibility of having links formed by
bilateral contracting: both endpoints must agree before creating a link between
them and the two players share (half-half) the cost of establishing the link. NCG
models can be cooperative –a possibility introduced by [1]– and therefore any
node can purchase any amount of any link in the resulting graph, and a link
can be created when its cost is covered by a set of players. The model stud-
ied in [7] (see also [6]) considers the notion of bounded distance per player and
propose two variants: the MaxBD game and the SumBD game, corresponding
to the original Max and Sum cost models respectively. The cost in those games
depends on whether the player’s eccentricity is smaller or equal than the asso-
ciated bounded distance. In that case a player pays the number of established
links, otherwise its cost is infinite. For further variants we refer the Interested
reader to [12,16,8,11,15,2,3,5,18,10,13] among others.
We introduce celebrity games a NCG where players have different weights
and share a common distance bound. As far as we understand, not all the nodes
in Internet based networks have the same importance. It is though natural to
consider players with different relevance weights. In such a setting, the cost of
being far (even if connected) from important nodes (the ones with high weight)
should be higher than the cost of having them close. Intuitively, the goal of each
player in celebrity games is to buy as few links as possible in order to have the
high-weighted nodes (or groups of nodes) closer to the given critical distance.
Observe that if the cost of establishing links is higher than the benefit of having
close a node (or set of nodes), players might rather prefer to stay either far or
even disconnected from it.
Our aim is to study the combined effect of having players with different
weights that share a common bounded distance. Although heterogeneous players
have been considered recently in the context of NCG under bilateral contract-
ing [17,4], and [7] consider the notion of bounded distance, to the best of our
knowledge this is the first model that studies how a common critical distance,
different weights, and a link cost, altogether affect the individual preferences of
the players.
In our model the cost of a player has two components. The first one is the
cost of the links established by the node. The second one is the sum of the
weights of those nodes that are farther away than the critical distance. More
specifically, the parameters of a celebrity game are: a weight to each player; a
cost for establishing a link; and a critical distance. Formally, a celebrity game
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is defined by Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉, where V is a set of nodes with weights
(wu)u∈V , α is the cost of establishing a link and, β establishes the desirable
distance bound. Celebrity games include the MaxBD games introduced in [7] (see
Section 5 for the details). They capture not only the cases in which players are
indistinguishable but those cases where the players may have different weights
affecting differently the costs of the other players.
We analyze the structural properties of the Nash equilibrium (ne) graphs of
celebrity games and their quality with respect to the optimal strategies under
the usual social cost. To do so we address the cases β = 1 and β > 1 separately.
Notice that, for β = 1, each player u has to decide for every non-edge (u, v) of
the graph to pay either α for the link or wv (the weight of the non-adjacent node
v) while, for β > 1, every player u has to choose for each non-edge (u, v) between
buying the link (u, v) and paying α minus the sum of the weights of those nodes
whose distance to u will become less or equal than the critical distance β or
paying the sum of the weights of the nodes with distance to u greater than β.
For the general case β > 1 our results can be summarized as follows:
– Computing a best response for a player is NP-hard
– The optimal social cost of a celebrity game Γ depends on the relation between
the total sum of the weights W and the cost α of buying a link: opt(Γ ) =
min{α,W}(n − 1). Nevertheless, pure ne always exist and ne graphs are
either connected or a set of isolated nodes. Again, the relationship between
the cost of establishing a link and the weight of the nodes leads to different
types of ne.
– We use the term celebrity for a node whose weight is strictly greater than the
cost of establishing a link. Having at least one celebrity guarantees that all ne
graphs are connected, although there are celebrity games without celebrities
that still have connected ne graphs. In those games having a connected ne
graph, a star tree is always a ne graph. We called this subfamily of celebrity
games star celebrity games.
– For star celebrity games, we obtain a general upper bound of 2β + 1 for
the diameter of ne graphs. In particular, if G is a ne tree we show that
diam(G) ≤ β+1, otherwise β/2 < diam(G) ≤ 2β+1. The upper bound can
be improved by considering the relationship between α and the maximum
and minimum weights, wmax and wmin, respectively. So, if wmin ≤ α <
wmax, then diam(G) ≤ 2β. On the contrary, if α < wmin, then diam(G) ≤ β.
– For star celebrity games with α < wmin, we show that the set of ne strategy
profiles coincides with the set of ne strategy profiles of a MaxBD game with
uniform bounded distance β.
– We find several bounds on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and of stability (PoS).
For non-star celebrity games PoS = PoA = max {1,W/α}. For star celebrity
games the PoS is 1 and we obtain a general upper bound ofO(min{n/β,W/α})
for the PoA. We also show particular games on n players having PoA = Ω(n),
for β = 2. To complement those results we prove that the PoA on ne trees
is constant (special cases like trees are also considered in the literature, see
for instance [2,3,13].
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Finally, for the particular case β = 1, we show that computing a best response
for a player is polynomial time solvable and that the PoA is at most 2.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic def-
initions and the celebrity games model. We also show that computing a best
response is NP-hard. In Section 3 we set the fundamental properties of ne and
optimal graphs. We characterize star celebrity games and we provide the first
bounds for the PoA and the PoS. Section 4 is devoted to the study of the diame-
ter of ne graphs. Section 5 studies the relation between the MaxBD game model
and the celebrity game model. In Section 6 we derive the bounds for the PoA.
In Section 7 we give the upper bound of the PoA over ne trees and in Section 8
we study the case β = 1. Finally, we state some conclusions and open problems
in Section 9.
2 The Model
In this section we introduce celebrity games and we analyze the complexity of
computing a best response. Let us start with some definitions. We use standard
notation for graphs and strategic games. All the graphs in the paper are undi-
rected unless explicitly said otherwise. Given a graph G = (V,E) and u, v ∈ V ,
dG(u, v) denotes the distance between u and v inG, i.e., the length of the shortest
path from u to v. The diameter (or eccentricity) of a vertex u ∈ V is diam(u) =
maxv∈V dG(u, v) and the diameter of G is diam(G) = maxv∈V diam(v). An ori-
entation of an undirected graph is an assignment of a direction to every edge of
the graph, turning it into a directed graph. A bridge is an edge whose deletion
increases the number of connected components of the graph. For a weighted
set (V, (wu)u∈V ) we extend the weight function to subsets in the usual way. For
U ⊆ V , w(U) =
∑
u∈U wu. Furthermore, we setW = w(V ), wmax = maxu∈V wu
and wmin = minu∈V wu.
Definition 1. A celebrity game Γ is a tuple 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 where: V =
{1, . . . , n} is the set of players, for each player u ∈ V , wu > 0 is the weight of
player u, α > 0 is the cost of establishing a link, and β, 1 ≤ β ≤ n − 1, is the
critical distance.
A strategy for player u in Γ is a subset Su ⊆ V − {u}, the set of players
for which player u pays for establishing a direct link. A strategy profile for Γ
is a tuple S = (S1, . . . , Sn) that assigns a strategy to each player. Every strat-
egy profile S has associated an outcome graph, the undirected graph defined by
G[S] = (V, {{u, v}|u ∈ Sv ∨ v ∈ Su}).
We denote by cu(S) = α|Su| +
∑
{v|dG[S](u,v)>β}
wv the cost of player u in
the strategy profile S. And, as usual, the social cost of a strategy profile S in Γ
is defined as C(S) =
∑
u∈V cu(S).
Observe that, even though a link might be established by only one of the
two players, we assume that once a link is established it can be used in both
directions. Note also that players may have different weights. The player’s cost
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function has two components: the cost of establishing links and the sum of the
weights of those players who are farther away than the critical distance β. In our
model links have uniform length therefore w.l.o.g β is an integer. In what follows
we assume that, for a celebrity game Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉, the parameters
verify the required conditions. Furthermore, unless specifically stated, we assume
β > 1, the case β = 1 will be analyzed in Section 8. We use the following notation
n = |V |, S(u) is the set of strategies for player u and S(Γ ) is the set of strategy
profiles of Γ . For a strategy profile S ∈ S(Γ ) and a strategy S′u ∈ S(u), for
player u, (S−u, S
′
u) represents the strategy profile in which Su is replaced by S
′
u
while the strategies of the other players remain unchanged. The cost difference
∆(S−u, S
′
u) is defined as ∆(S−u, S
′
u) = cu(S−u, S
′
u) − cu(S). Observe that, if
∆(S−u, S
′
u) < 0, then player u has an incentive to deviate from Su and select
S′u. A best response to S ∈ S(Γ ) for player u is a strategy S
′
u ∈ S(u) minimizing
∆(S−u, S
′
u).
Let us recall the definition of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a celebrity game. A strategy profile
S ∈ S(Γ ) is a Nash equilibrium of Γ if no player has an incentive to deviate
from his strategy. Formally, for each player u and each strategy S′u ∈ S(u),
∆(S−u, S
′
u) ≥ 0.
We denote by NE(Γ ) the set of Nash equilibria of a game Γ and we use the
term ne to refer to a strategy profile S ∈ NE(Γ ). We say that a graph G is a
ne graph of Γ if there is S ∈ NE(Γ ) so that G = G[S]. We will drop the explicit
reference to Γ whenever Γ is clear from the context. It is worth observing that,
for S ∈ NE(Γ ), it never happens that v ∈ Su and u ∈ Sv, for any u, v ∈ V . Thus,
if G is the outcome of a ne S, S corresponds to an orientation of the edges in
G. Furthermore, a ne graph G can be the outcome of several strategy profiles
but not all the orientations of a ne graph G are ne.
Let opt(Γ ) = minS∈S(Γ ) C(S) be the minimum value of the social cost. We
use the term opt strategy profile to refer to one strategy profile with optimal
social cost.
Observe that, when in a strategy profile S, two players u and v are such that
u ∈ Sv and v ∈ Su, the social cost is higher than when only one of them is paying
for the connection {u, v} and therefore, as for ne, this does not happen in an opt
strategy profile. In the following, as we are interested in ne and opt strategies,
among all the possible strategy profiles having the same outcome graph, we
only consider those corresponding to orientations of the outcome graph. In this
sense the social cost depends only on the outcome graph, the weights and the
parameters. Thus, we can express the social cost of a strategy profile as a function
of the outcome graph G as follows
C(G) = α|E(G)|+
∑
u∈V
∑
{v|dG(u,v)>β}
wv = α|E(G)|+
∑
{(u,v)|u<v and dG(u,v)>β}
(wu+wv).
We make use of three particular outcome graphs on n vertexes: Kn, the
complete graph; In, the independent set; and STn the star graph, i.e., a tree in
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which one of the vertexes, the central one, has a direct link to all the other n−1
vertexes. For those graphs, we have the following values of the social cost. For
Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉, with |V | = n, C(Kn) = αn(n− 1)/2, C(In) =W (n− 1),
for β ≥ 1. Furthermore, C(STn) = α(n − 1), for 1 < β ≤ n− 1, and C(STn) =
α(n− 1) + (n− 2)(W − wc) where c is the central vertex, for β = 1.
We define the PoA and the PoS as usual.
Definition 3. Let Γ be a celebrity game. The Price of Anarchy of Γ is de-
fined as PoA(Γ ) = maxS∈NE(Γ ) C(S)/opt(Γ ) and the Price of Stability of Γ as
PoS(Γ ) = minS∈NE(Γ ) C(S)/opt(Γ ).
Our first result shows that computing a best response in celebrity games is
NP-hard by a reduction from the minimum dominating set problem. The problem
becomes tractable for β = 1 as we show in Section 8.
Proposition 1. Computing a best response for a player to a strategy profile in
a celebrity game is NP-hard, even when β = 2 and restricted to the cases in
which all players except possibly one have weights bigger than α.
Proof. We provide a reduction from the problem of computing a dominating set
of minimum size which is a classical NP-hard problem. Recall that a dominating
set of a graph G = (V,E) is a set U ⊂ V such that any vertex u ∈ V is in U or
has a neighbor in U .
Let G = (V,E) be a graph, we associate to G and u a celebrity game Γ =
〈V ′, (wv)v∈V ′ , α, β〉, and a strategy profile S as follows:
– The set of players is V ′ = V ∪ {u}, where u is a new player (i.e. u 6∈ V ).
– β = 2, α = 1.5,
– for every v ∈ V , wv = 2.
– The strategy profile S is obtained from an orientation of the edges in G
setting Su = ∅. Observe that by construction G[S] is the disjoint union of G
with the isolated vertex u.
Finally, set u to be the player for which we want to compute the best response
to S. Observe that the weight of u has not been defined yet.
Let D ⊆ V be a strategy for player u. Notice that, if D is a dominating set of
G, then cu(S−u, D) = α|D|+
∑
x∈V,d(u,x)>2 2 = α|D|. If D is not a dominating
set of G, cu(S−u, D) = α|D|+
∑
x∈V,d(u,x)>2 2 > α(|D| + |{x ∈ V |d(u, x) > 2}|.
Then, D∪{x ∈ V |d(u, x) > 2} is a better response than D and furthermore it is
a dominating set. Hence, the best response of player u is a dominating set D of G
of minimum size. To conclude the proof just notice that the described reduction
is polynomial time computable and that we did not make any assumption on
the weight of the node u.
3 Social Optimum and Nash equilibrium
We analyze here the main properties of opt and ne strategy profiles in celebrity
games. We start analyzing the cost of optimal graphs for the social cost. Then
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we characterize the family of star celebrity games having a connected ne graph.
Finally, we provide exact bounds on the PoA and the PoS in some particular
cases.
Proposition 2. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a celebrity game. We have that
opt(Γ ) = min{α,W}(n− 1).
Proof. Let S ∈ opt(Γ ), and letG = G[S] with connected componentsG1, ..., Gr,
Vi = V (Gi), ki = |Vi|, and Wi = w(Vi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Observe that the social
cost of a disconnected graph can be expressed as the sum of the social cost of its
connected components. Each connected component must be a tree of diameter
at most β, otherwise a strategy profile with smaller social cost could be obtained
by replacing the connections on Vi by such a tree. We can assume w.l.o.g. that,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the i-th connected component is a star graph STki of ki vertexes.
Since C(STk) = α(k − 1) we have that
C(G) =
r∑
i=1
α(ki − 1) +
r∑
i=1
ki(W −Wi) = α(n− r) + nW −
r∑
i=1
kiWi.
As 1 ≤ ki ≤ n− (r − 1), we have W ≤
∑r
i=1 kiWi ≤ (n − r + 1)W . Therefore,
α(n− r) + (r − 1)W ≤ C(G). We consider two cases.
Case 1: α ≥ W . We have W (n − 1) ≤ C(G). Since C(In) = W (n− 1) ≤ C(G)
and G is an optimal graph, then C(G) =W (n− 1).
Case 2: α < W . Now α(n − 1) ≤ C(G). As C(STn) = α(n − 1) ≤ C(G),
the optimal graph G has a social cost C(G) = α(n − 1). We conclude that
opt = min{α,W}(n− 1).
Now we turn our attention to the study of the ne graph topologies showing that
any ne graph is either an independent set or a connected graph.
Proposition 3. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a celebrity game. Every ne graph
of Γ is either connected or the graph In, where n = |V |.
Proof. If n ≤ 2 the proposition follows immediately. When n > 2, let us suppose
that there is a ne S such that the graph G = G[S] is not connected and different
from In. In this case G is composed of at least two different connected compo-
nents G1 and G2. Furthermore, as G 6= In, we can assume that |V (G1)| > 1 as
at least one of the connected components contains two vertexes connected by
an edge. Let u ∈ V (G1) be such that Su 6= ∅. Let x ∈ Su and v ∈ V (G2). Let
us consider the strategies S′u = Su \ {x} and S
′
v = Sv ∪ {x}. As S is a ne we
know that ∆(S−u, S
′
u) ≥ 0. Let G
′ = G[S−v, S
′
v], observe that dG′(v, u) = 2 ≤ β,
therefore ∆(S−v, S
′
v) ≤ −∆(S−u, S
′
u)−wu < 0. This contradicts the hypothesis
that S is a ne.
Next we study the conditions under which particular topologies are ne graphs.
Those results prove that celebrity games always have a ne.
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Proposition 4. Every celebrity game Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 has a ne. Fur-
thermore, when α ≥ wmax, In is a ne graph, otherwise STn is a ne graph but
In is not, where n = |V |.
Proof. When α ≥ wmax let us show that In is a ne graph. Observe that G = In
is the outcome of a unique strategy profile S in which Su = ∅, for any u ∈ V .
Let us consider a player u and a strategy S′u 6= ∅. The cost difference of player u
is then ∆(S−u, S
′
u) = α|S
′
u|−
∑
v∈S′u
wv =
∑
v∈S′u
(α−wv) ≥ 0. Therefore player
u has no incentive to deviate from Su and In is a ne graph.
When α < wmax, let u be a vertex with wu = wmax and let STn be a star
graph with n vertexes in which the center is u, let us show that STn is a ne
graph. Consider the strategy profile S in which Su = ∅ and Sv = {u}, for any
v ∈ V different from u. Observe that the center u is a vertex with maximum
weight. As β > 1 no player will get a cost decrease by connecting to more players.
Furthermore, for u 6= v, wv + α < wv + wmax < W . Thus α < W − wv and v
will not get any benefit by deleting the actual connection. The only remaining
possibility is to reconnect to another vertex, but in such a case the cost cannot
decrease. Therefore, STn is a ne graph. Notice that in this case In can not be a
ne, as every player u has incentive to connect with any other player v such that
wv = wmax.
To conclude the study of ne we characterize the celebrity games where In is
the unique ne graph. The negated condition characterizes those games in which
STn is a ne.
Proposition 5. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a celebrity game on n players
with α ≥ wmax. If there is more than one vertex u ∈ V with α > W − wu, then
In is the unique ne graph of Γ , otherwise STn is a ne graph of Γ .
Proof. Assume that, for two vertexes u 6= v, α > W − wu and α > W − wv,
and that there exists a ne graph G = G[S] different from In. By Proposition 3,
G is connected. Therefore, it has at least n− 1 edges. Since, α > W − wu and
α > W − wv, we have that Su = Sv = ∅, otherwise S would not be a ne.
Therefore, there must be a vertex, z 6= u, v such that |Sz| ≥ 2. Let x, y ∈ Sz and
consider the strategy S′z = Sz \ {x, y}. Then, ∆(S−z , S
′
z) ≤ −2α+W − wz . As
G is a ne graph and we have that 2α > W − wu +W − wv, we conclude that
W −wz ≥ 2α > W −wu+W −wv. Hence, W < wu+wv−wz < wu+wv, which
is impossible. In the case that there is at most one vertex u with α > W − wu,
the strategy profile S, where Su = ∅, and Sv = {u}, for all v 6= u, is a ne.
Furthermore G[S] = STn.
Corollary 1. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a celebrity game on n players. In
is the unique ne graph of Γ if and only if α ≥ wmax and there is more than one
vertex u ∈ V such that α > W − wu.
Observe that in our model it is preferable to be an isolated node than to pay
a huge amount for establishing a link. In fact, in a ne graph either all nodes
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are isolated, or the graph is connected. Hence, selecting an appropriate price per
link is a key fact to guarantee the connectivity of the equilibrium graphs.
Finally, using this characterization, we can formally define the subfamily of
celebrity games that have always a connected ne graph. Those games have STn
as a ne graph.
Definition 4. Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 is a star celebrity game if Γ has a ne
graph that is connected.
Corollary 2. For a celebrity game Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉, the following state-
ments are equivalent.
– Γ is a star celebrity game.
– Either α < wmax or α ≥ wmax and there is at most one u ∈ V for which
α > W − wu.
– STn is a ne graph of Γ .
Putting all together we can compute the PoS and, in some cases, the PoA.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a celebrity game. Then we have.
– If Γ is a star celebrity game, PoS(Γ ) = 1.
– If Γ is not a star celebrity game and α ≥W , then PoS(Γ ) = PoA(Γ ) = 1.
– If Γ is not a star celebrity game and α < W , then PoS(Γ ) = PoA(Γ ) =
W/α > 1.
Proof. From Proposition 2, we have that opt(Γ ) = W (n − 1) if α ≥ W and
opt(Γ ) = α(n − 1), otherwise. When Γ is a star celebrity game, by Corollary
2 we know that STn is a ne graph. Let us see that in star celebrity games it
can only occur that α < W . If α < wmax, clearly α < W . If α ≥ wmax, by
Corollary 2 there is at most one u ∈ V for which α > W − wu. Assuming that
wu1 ≤ . . . ≤ wun−1 ≤ wun , we have that W > W − wu1 ≥ . . . ≥ W − wun−1 ≥
W − wun , and then W − wun−1 ≥ α. Hence, PoS(Γ ) = 1.
When Γ is not a star celebrity game, In is the unique ne graph. Thus,
when α ≥ W we have, PoS(Γ ) = PoA(Γ ) = 1 and, when α < W we have,
PoS(Γ ) = PoA(Γ ) =W/α > 1.
4 Critical distance and diameter in Nash equilibrium
graphs
In this section we analyze the diameter of ne graphs and its relationship with
the parameters defining the game. We are interested only in games in which ne
graphs with finite diameter exist, thus we only consider star celebrity games. In
stating the characterization, nodes with a high weight with respect to the link
cost play a fundamental role and it is worth to give them a name.
Definition 5. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a celebrity game. We say that a
vertex u ∈ V is a celebrity if α < wu.
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Given a celebrity u, any other node v with d(u, v) > β has an incentive to
pay for connecting to u. Thus, in any ne graph G, every celebrity node u satisfies
that diam(u) ≤ β.
In some of the proofs of the following results we refer to a set of critical
nodes z ∈ V of a graph G = (V,E) with respect to a node u and an edge {x, y}.
Critical is used in the sense that as all the shortest paths from u to z use {x, y},
removing the edge {x, y} results in an increase of the distance from u to z. We
use the notation
AG{x,y}(u) = {z ∈ V | all the shortest paths in G from u to z use the edge {x, y}}
We drop the explicit reference to G whenever G is clear from the context.
Proposition 6. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a star celebrity game. If G is a
ne graph of Γ , then diam(G) ≤ 2β + 1.
Proof. Let S be a ne of Γ such that G = G[S]. Assume that diam(G) ≥ 2β+2.
Then, there are two nodes u, v ∈ V such that d(u, v) = 2β + 2. Consider a
shortest path from u to v, u = u0, u1, . . . , u2β+1, u2β+2 = v.
Let Au = {x ∈ V |d(u, x) ≤ β} and let Au1 = {x ∈ V |d(u1, x) ≤ β}.
Let us show that if a node x ∈ Au ∪ Au1 , then d(x, v) > β. If x ∈ Au then
d(x, v) > β, otherwise d(u, v) ≤ d(u, x) + d(x, v) ≤ 2β contradicting the fact
that d(u, v) = 2β+2. Moreover, if x ∈ Au1 then d(x, v) > β, otherwise d(u, v) ≤
1+d(u1, x)+d(x, v) ≤ 2β+1 which also contradicts the fact that d(u, v) = 2β+2.
Consider the edge {u, u1}. Then, either u1 ∈ Su or u ∈ Su1 . In the case that
u1 ∈ Su, let S′u = Su \ {u1} and S
′
v = Sv ∪ {u1}. Observe that,
∆(S−u, S
′
u) ≤ −α+ w(A{u,u1}(u) ∩Au)
By the previous remark about distances, we know that all the vertexes x ∈
A{u,u1}(u) ∩ Au verify d(x, v) > β, but after adding {v, u1} all of them and u
become at distance ≤ β from v, therefore
∆(S−v, S
′
v) ≤ α− wu − w(A{u,u1}(u) ∩ Au).
Hence, ∆(S−u, S
′
u) +∆(S−v, S
′
v) ≤ −wu < 0. Therefore, either ∆(S−u, S
′
u) < 0
or ∆(S−v, S
′
v) < 0 and then S can not be a ne.
The case u ∈ Su1 , follows in a similar way by interchanging the roles of u
and u1.
The previous result can be refined to get better bounds on the diameter when
all the nodes are celebrities or when at least one of the nodes is a celebrity.
Property 1. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a star celebrity game and let G be a
ne graph of Γ , then
– if wmin ≤ α < wmax, diam(G) ≤ 2β and,
– if α < wmin, diam(G) ≤ β.
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Proof. When wmin ≤ α < wmax, there is a celebrity u ∈ V with wu > α. We
know that diam(u) ≤ β. Let x and z be any two different nodes of G, then
d(x, u) ≤ β and d(z, u) ≤ β. Therefore, d(x, z) ≤ d(x, u) + d(z, u) ≤ 2β and the
claim follows. When α < wmin, each u ∈ V is a celebrity, thus diam(u) ≤ β.
Therefore diam(G) ≤ β.
For ne trees we have a trivial lower bound of 2 on the diameter as a star is
a ne graph. For non-tree ne graphs we provide a lower bound on the diameter.
We first prove a technical result.
Lemma 1. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a star celebrity game. In a ne graph
of Γ containing at least one cycle, if u is a node of a cycle and diam(u) ≤ β−k,
for some k ≥ 1, then the length of any cycle containing u is bigger than 2k + 2.
Proof. Let us suppose that S is a ne and that G = G[S] contains a cycle C
through a node u such that diam(u) ≤ β − k, for some k ≥ 1. Assume that C
is the shortest cycle containing u and that the length ℓ of C verifies ℓ ≤ 2k + 2.
We split the proof in two cases, depending on the parity of ℓ.
Case 1: C has odd length, ℓ = 2i + 1. Let v1, v2 be the two vertexes in C that
are at distance i of u in C, as C is of minimal length d(u, v1) = d(u, v2) = i. By
our hypothesis, 2i + 1 ≤ 2k + 2 and thus i ≤ k. Assume w.l.o.g. that v2 ∈ Sv1
and consider the strategy S′v1 = Sv1 \ {v2}. Let G
′ = G[S−v1 , S
′
v1 ]. Notice that
dG′(v2, u) = i. Therefore, diamG′(v1) ≤ k+β− k = β, by selecting a path going
through u, so ∆(S−v1 , S
′
v1) ≤ −α < 0 and G would not be a ne graph.
Case 2: C has even length, ℓ = 2i. Let v be the antipodal vertex to u, at distance
i from u in C and let v1, v2 be the two vertexes in C that are at distance i− 1 of
u in C. By our hypothesis, 2i ≤ 2k + 2 and thus i − 1 ≤ k. If v ∈ Sv1 , consider
the strategy S′v1 = Sv1 \ {v}. Using the same arguments as in Case 1 and the
fact that the distance from v1 to u in C is ≤ k, we conclude that S is not a
ne. The same happens when v ∈ Sv2 . It remains to consider the case in which
v1, v2 ∈ Sv. Consider the strategy S′v = (Sv ∪ {u}) \ {v1, v2}. Now all shortest
paths in G from v passing through v1 or v2 can be rerouted trough u with and
increment in length of at most i− 1 ≤ k. Therefore, diamG′(v) ≤ 1+ β− k ≤ β.
Thus ∆(S−v, S
′
v) ≤ −α < 0 and G would not be a ne graph.
Proposition 7. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a star celebrity game and let G
be a ne graph of Γ . If G is not a tree, then diam(G) > β/2.
Proof. Let G be a ne graph containing at least one cycle. If diam(G) ≥ β, the
claim holds. Assume that diam(G) ≤ β − 1. We know that the length of the
shortest cycle C is ≤ 2 diam(G) + 1. Let u be any node of C. Then, we have
diam(u) ≤ diam(G) = β − (β − diam(G)). By Lemma 1, 2 diam(G) + 1 >
2(β − diam(G)) + 2. The last inequality implies diam(G) > β/2.
11
5 MaxBD network creation games versus celebrity games
In this section we show that MaxBD games are equivalent to celebrity games
where all players are celebrities. Let us formalize the definition of MaxBD game
taken from [7].
A MaxBD game Γ is defined by a tuple 〈V,D〉 where V = {1, . . . , n} is the
set of players and D, 1 ≤ D ≤ n− 1, is an integer representing the bound on the
diameter of each node v ∈ V . Concepts like strategy of a player, strategy profile,
and outcome graph are defined as in the celebrity game model. The cost of player
u in the strategy profile S is cMaxBDu (S) = |Su|, if diamG[S](u) ≤ D; c
MaxBD
u (S) =
+∞, otherwise. The social cost of S is CMaxBD(S) =
∑
u∈V c
MaxBD
u (S). Notice
that by the definition of MaxBD game, any strategy profile S that is either a ne
or a social opt satisfies diamG[S](u) ≤ D and, therefore C(S) = αC
MaxBD(S).
In the following we show how a MaxBD game can be translated, preserving
ne, to different instances of celebrity games. A MaxBD game can be seen as a
celebrity game in which the weights of each one of the players are large enough
so that buying a link is more suitable than having an eccentricity greater than
the given distance bound. On the other hand, we show that every celebrity game
with α < wmin corresponds to a MaxBD game, again preserving ne.
Proposition 8. Let V be a set of players and β > 1. Let Γ = 〈V, β〉 be a
MaxBD game and Γ ′ = 〈V, (wv)v∈V , α, β〉 be a celebrity game where α < wmin.
Then, ne(Γ ) = ne(Γ ′).
Proof. Let us prove first that ne(Γ ) ⊇ ne(Γ ′). Assume that S ∈ ne(Γ ′). By
Property 1, diamG[S](u) ≤ β and this implies that cu(S) = α|Su|. Let us suppose
that S is not a ne for Γ . Then there exists a player u ∈ V and a strategy S′u
such that cMaxBDu (S
′) < cMaxBDu (S) = |Su|, where S
′ = (S−u, S
′
u). Hence, the only
possibility is that diamG[S′](u) ≤ β and |S
′
u| < |Su|. Therefore cu(S
′) < cu(S)
contradicting the fact that S ∈ ne(Γ ′).
It remains to show that ne(Γ ) ⊆ ne(Γ ′). Let S ∈ ne(Γ ). We know that
diam(G[S]) ≤ β and cMaxBDu (S) = |Su|, for u ∈ V . For Γ
′, we have that cu(S) =
α|Su|. Now let us assume that S is not a ne of Γ ′. Then, there exists u ∈ V and
a strategy S′u such that cu(S) > cu(S
′), where S′ = (S−u, S
′
u). Since wv > α,
then we have that cu(S
′) = α|S′u| +
∑
{v|dG[(S′)](u,v)>β}
wv ≥ α(|S′u| + |{v |
dG[S′](u, v) > β}|). Consider the strategy profile S
′′ = (S−u, S
′′
u), where S
′′
u =
S′u ∪ {v | dG[S′](u, v) > β}. We have diamG[(S′′](u) ≤ β. Thus, cu(S
′′) = α|S′′u |.
Combining the inequalities cu(S) = α|Su| > cu(S′′) = α|S′′u |. Then, |Su| > |S
′′
u |
contradicting the fact that S ∈ ne(Γ ).
The previous correspondences allow us to get a relationship on the PoA and
the PoS,
Corollary 3. Let V be a set of players and β > 1. Let Γ = 〈V, β〉 be a MaxBD
game and let Γ ′ = 〈V, (wv)v∈V , α, β〉 be a celebrity game where α < wmin. Then,
– PoS(Γ ) = PoS(Γ ′) = 1,
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– PoA(Γ ) = PoA(Γ ′).
Proof. We know by Proposition 4 that the star tree is a social optimum as well
as a ne for celebrity games when α < wmin. The same occurs for MaxBD games
as it was shown in Theorem 3.3 of [6]. Hence, PoS(Γ ) = PoS(Γ ′) = 1.
For the celebrity game Γ ′, we have that
PoA(Γ ) =
αmaxS∈NE(Γ ){|E(G[S])|}
α(n− 1)
=
maxS∈NE(Γ ){|E(G[S])|}
(n− 1)
.
By Proposition 8, ne(Γ ) = ne(Γ ′). Thus ne of Γ ′ have diameter ≤ β and then
we can conclude that PoA(Γ ) = PoA(Γ ′).
Hence, the upper bound on the PoA of MaxBD games shown in [7] is also
an upper bound for celebrity games. In the subsequent sections we consider the
general case where the assumption α < wmin is not required.
We have considered here only the uniform version of the MaxBD games in
which the eccentricity bound is equal for all the nodes. [7] considers also a non
uniform version in which each node has a different eccentricity requirement. It is
easy to extend Proposition 8 to show that the set of ne is preserved provided that
the eccentricity bounds are the same in both games and α < wmin. Therefore,
non-uniform celebrity games have unbounded PoA, as it was shown for the non-
uniform MaxBD games in [7].
6 Bounding the price of anarchy
We provide here bounds on the contribution of the edges and the weights to the
social cost of ne graphs. Those bounds allow us to provide a bound on the PoA.
Our next result establishes an upper bound on the PoA in terms of W and α.
Lemma 2. For a star celebrity game Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉, PoA(Γ ) ≤W/α.
Proof. Let S be a ne of Γ and let G = G[S] = (V,E). As S is a ne, no player
has an incentive to deviate from S. Thus, for any u ∈ V ,
0 ≤ ∆(S−u, ∅) ≤ −α|Su|+ w({v | d(u, v) ≤ β})− wu.
Summing up, for all u ∈ V , we have
0 ≤
∑
u∈V
(−α|Su|+
∑
{v|d(u,v)≤β}
wv − wu) = −α|E|+
∑
u∈V
∑
{v|d(u,v)≤β}
wv −W.
Therefore,
C(G) = α|E|+
∑
u∈V
∑
{v|d(u,v)>β}
wv
≤
∑
u∈V

 ∑
{v|d(u,v)≤β}
wv +
∑
{v|d(u,v)>β}
wv

−W = (n− 1)W.
Hence, PoA(Γ ) ≤ (n−1)Wα(n−1) =
W
α .
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Using the previous lemma we can get anO(n) upper bound on the PoA of star
celebrity games. Let us see that this upper bound can be improved by bounding
the weight component and the link component of the social cost, separately.
Define the weight component of the social cost, for a critical distance β,
W (G, β), as
W (G, β) =
∑
u∈V (G)
∑
{v|d(u,v)>β}
wv =
∑
{{u,v}|d(u,v)>β}
(wu + wv).
Lemma 3. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a star celebrity game. In a ne graph
G, W (G, β) = O(αn2/β).
Proof. Let S be a ne and G = G[S] be a ne graph. Let u ∈ V and let b =
diam(u). Recall that, by Proposition 6, b ≤ 2β + 1. We have three cases.
Case 1: b < β. For any node v ∈ V \ {u} consider the strategy S′v = Sv ∪ {u},
and let G′ = G[S−v, S
′
v]. By connecting to u we have diamG′(v) ≤ β and, as S
is a ne, we have
∆(S−v, S
′
v) = α−
∑
{x|dG(x,v)>β}
wx ≥ 0.
Therefore we have ∑
{x|dG(x,v)>β}
wx ≤ α.
As b < β we conclude that
W (G, β) ≤ nα.
Since 1 < β ≤ n− 1, we get n/β ≤ αn2/β.
Case 2: b ≥ β and b ≥ 6. For 1 ≤ i ≤ b, consider the set Ai(u) = {v | d(u, v) = i}
and the sets
C1 = {v ∈ V | 1 ≤ d(u, v) ≤ b/3} = ∪1≤i≤b/3Ai(u),
C2 = {v ∈ V | b/3 < d(u, v) ≤ 2b/3} = ∪b/3<j≤2b/3Aj(u),
C3 = {v ∈ V | 2b/3 < d(u, v) ≤ b} = ∪2b/3<k≤bAk(u).
As b = diam(u), Aℓ(u) 6= ∅, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ b, and all those sets constitute a partition of
V \{u}. As b ≥ 6, for each ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 3, Cℓ contains vertexes at a b/3 ≥ 2 different
distances. Therefore, for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 3, it must exist iℓ such that Aiℓ(u) ⊆ Cℓ and
|Aiℓ(u)| ≤ 3n/b, otherwise the total number of elements in Cℓ would be bigger
than n.
For any v ∈ V , let S′v = (Sv ∪ Ai1 (u) ∪ Ai2 (u) ∪ Ai3 (u)) \ {v} and let
G′ = G[S−v, S
′
v]. Since b ≤ 2β+1, we have that b/3 < β. Hence, by construction,
diamG′(v) ≤ β. Therefore, as S is a ne, we have
0 ≤ ∆(S−v, S
′
v) ≤
9nα
β
−
∑
{x|dG(x,v)>β}
wx.
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Thus, ∑
{x|dG(x,v)>β}
wx ≤
9nα
β
and W (G, β) ≤
9n2α
β
.
Case 3: b ≥ β and b ≤ 6. Consider the sets Ai(u) = {v | d(u, v) = i}, 0 ≤ i ≤ b,
and the sets C0 = {v ∈ V | d(u, v) is even} and C1 = V \ C0. Both sets are
non-empty and one of them must have ≤ n/2 vertexes. By connecting to all the
vertexes in the smaller of those sets the diameter of the resulting graph is 2.
Therefore, using a similar argument as in case 2, we get
W (G, β) ≤
n2α
2
,
which is O(n2/β) as β < 6. Which concludes the proof.
Our next result provides a bound for the number of edges in a ne graph.
Lemma 4. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a star celebrity game. In a ne graph
G, |E(G)| ≤ n− 1 + 3n
2
β .
Proof. Let S be a ne of Γ and let G = G[S] = (V,E). Let u be a node in V .
For any v ∈ Su, recall that A{u,v}(u) denotes the set of nodes z such that all
shortest paths from u to z use the edge {u, v}. Observe that v ∈ A{u,v}(u) and
that, for v, v′ ∈ Su with v 6= v′, A{u,v}(u) ∩A{u,v′}(u) = ∅.
Let B(G) be the set of bridges of G, recall that |B(G)| ≤ n−1. For u ∈ V , let
B(u) = {x ∈ Su | {u, x} /∈ B(G)}. Observe that |E| = |B(G)| +
∑
u∈V |B(u)|.
Let us show that for any v ∈ Su such that {u, v} is not a bridge, there exists
z ∈ A{u,v}(u) such that d(u, z) > β/3.
Let us suppose that {u, v} is not a bridge and that, for every z ∈ A{u,v}(u)
d(u, z) ≤ β/3. In such a case there must be some edge {x, y} with x /∈ A{u,v}(u)
and y ∈ A{u,v}(u). Furthermore, we can select x so that x 6= u and such that
there is a shortest path P from u to x using only vertexes in V \ A{u,v}(u).
Observe that d(u, x) ≤ d(u, y) + 1. Furthermore, for z ∈ A{u,v}(u), there exists
a path from u to z that follows P from u to x, the edge {x, y}, a shortest path
from y to v (part of a shortest path to u through A{u,v}(u)), and a shortest
path from v to z (through A{u,v}(u)). Notice that d(u, x) ≤ β/3 + 1, d(y, v) ≤
β/3 − 1, and d(v, z) ≤ β/3 − 1. Hence, there is a path from u to z of distance
≤ (β/3+1)+1+(β/3−1)+(β/3−1) = β which does not use {u, v}. Thus, u has
incentive to remove {u, v} since ∆(S−u, Su \ {v}) = −α < 0, which contradicts
the fact that S is a ne.
Therefore, for v ∈ B(u), there exists z ∈ A{u,v}(u) such that d(u, z) > β/3
and as all the predecessors of z in a shortest path from u belong to A{u,v}(u), we
have |A{u,v}(u)| > β/3. Observe that n ≥
∑
{v∈Su|v∈B(u)}
|Au,v(u)| ≥ |B(u)|(β/3),
thus |B(u)| ≤ 3nβ . Finally, combining the two bounds, we have |E| = |B(G)| +∑
u∈V |B(u)| ≤ (n− 1) +
3n2
β .
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Observe that, the previous results jointly with opt(Γ ) = α(n − 1), leads us
to the following upper bound of the PoA.
Theorem 2. For a star celebrity game Γ , PoA(Γ ) = O(min{n/β,W/α}).
We finalize this section showing a family of star celebrity games having PoA =
Ω(n), for β = 2.
α
w1 w2
α
α
w3 w4
α
Fig. 1. A ne for the game Γ (4, α, w).
Lemma 5. Let k > 2, α > 0 and let w = (w1, . . . wk) be a positive weight
assignment. There is a star celebrity game Γ = Γ (k, α, w) with n = 2k players
and β = 2 having PoA(Γ ) > 3n8 .
Proof. Consider the game Γk = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉, where
– V = {u1, . . . , uk} ∪ {v1 . . . , vk},
– w(ui) = α and w(vi) = wi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
– β = 2.
Consider any strategy profile S where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, {u1, . . . , uk}∩Svi = {ui}
and Sui = ∅, and such that in G[S] the subgraph induced by {v1 . . . , vk} is a
clique. An example of such a strategy, for k = 4, is given in Figure 1.
Observe that there is no vertex in G[S] that is at distance 1 of more than one
vertex in {u1, . . . , uk}. Furthermore, any edge (u, v) lies in the unique shortest
path from u to a vertex in {u1, . . . , uk}. Therefore S is a ne.
We have C(G[S]) = α
(
k(k−1)
2 + k
)
+ αk(k − 1) = α(3k(k − 1) + 2k)/2. As
a star tree is an opt graph and n = 2k, we conclude that
PoA(Γ ) =
α
3n
2 (
n
2−1)+2
n
2
2
α(n− 1)
=
3n
8
(n− 1) + 13
(n− 1)
=
3n
8
(
1 +
1
3(n− 1)
)
.
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7 Price of anarchy on Nash equilibrium trees
Now we complement the results of the previous sections by providing a constant
upper bound on the PoA when we restrict the ne graphs to be trees. We can
find in the literature different models for which the diameter or the PoA can
not be proved to be constant on general ne graphs, but they are shown to be
constant in the case of ne trees (see for example [2,3,13]).
In order to get a tighter upper bound for the PoA on ne trees, we first
improve the bound on the diameter of ne trees to β + 1.
Proposition 9. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a star celebrity game. If T is a
ne tree of Γ , diam(T ) ≤ β + 1.
Proof. Let T be a tree such that T = G[S] where S is a ne of Γ . Let d = diam(T )
and let P : u = u0, u1, . . . , ud be a diametral path of T . Assume that d > β + 1.
For 1 ≤ i < d, let Ti be the connected subtree containing ui after removing edges
{ui−1, ui} and {ui, ui+1}. As P is a diametral path, both u and ud are leaves in
T . Furthermore, T1 and Td−1 are star trees. In general, the distance from the
leaves of any Ti to both u and ud is at most d.
We consider two cases depending on who is paying for the connections to the
end points of P .
Case 1: u ∈ Su1 or ud ∈ Sud−1 . W.l.o.g. assume that ud ∈ Sud−1 . As S is a ne we
have wud ≥ α. Consider the strategy S
′
u1 = Su1 ∪ {ud−1}, then ∆(S−u1 , S
′
u1) ≤
α− wud − wud−1 < 0 and T can not be a ne graph.
Case 2: u1 ∈ Su and ud−1 ∈ Sud . When β ≥ 3. Set S
′
u = Su − {u1} ∪ {u2}
and T ′ = G[(S−u, S
′
u)]. Observe that, for x ∈ T1, dT ′(u, x) ≤ 3 ≤ β and, for
x /∈ T1 ∪ {u}, dT ′(u, x) = dT (u, x) − 1. Therefore, ∆(S−u, S′u) ≤ −wuβ+1 < 0.
Therefore, T is not a ne graph.
The previous argument fails when β = 2 as there might be x ∈ T1 with
dT ′(u, x) = 3. From Proposition 6, we know that d ≤ 2β+1 ≤ 5. Let us see that
it can not be the case that d = 4 or d = 5. Let S′u = Su − {u1} ∪ {ud−1} and
S′ud = Sud − {ud−1} ∪ {u1}. Let T
1 = G[(S−u, S
′
u)] and T
2 = G[(S−ud , S
′
ud)].
When d = 4, for any x ∈ T2, dT 1(u, x) = dT (u, x) and dT 2(u4, x) = dT (u4, x).
Therefore, we have
∆(S−u, S
′
u) = w(T1)− w(T3)− wu4 and ∆(S−u4 , S
′
u4) = w(T3)− w(T1)− wu.
Thus ∆(S−u, S
′
u) +∆(S−u4 , S
′
u4) = −wu − wu4 < 0 and one of the two players
has an incentive to deviate.
When d = 5, we have ∆(S−u, S
′
u) = w(T1) + wu2 − wu3 − w(T4) − wu5
and ∆(S−u5 , S
′
u5) = w(T4) + wu3 − wu − w(T1) − wu2 . Therefore we have that
∆(S−u, S
′
u) +∆(S−u5 , S
′
u5) = −wu −wu5 < 0 and one of the two players has an
incentive to deviate.
We need to prove first an auxiliary result.
Lemma 6. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a star celebrity game and let G be a
ne graph of Γ . If there is v ∈ V with diamG(v) ≤ β−1, thenW (G, β) ≤ α(n−1).
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Proof. Let S ∈ ne(Γ ) and letG = G[S]. Let u ∈ V , u 6= v. If v /∈ Su,∆(S−u, Su∪
{v}) ≥ α−
∑
{x|dG(u,x)>β}
wx ≥ 0. But, if v ∈ Su, diam(u) ≤ β.
Hence, α ≥
∑
{x|dG(u,x)>β}
wx and summing over all u 6= v we have that
α(n− 1) ≥W (G, β).
The proof of the upper bound for the PoA on ne trees uses the previous
statements and examines the particular cases β = 2, 3.
Theorem 3. The PoA on ne trees of a star celebrity game is at most 2.
Proof. Let T be a ne tree of Γ . From Proposition 9 we have a bound on the
diameter, so we know that diam(T ) ≤ β + 1. Since T is a tree, we have that
there exists u ∈ V such that diam(u) ≤ (diam(T ) + 1)/2 ≤ β/2 + 1. If β ≥ 4,
then diam(u) ≤ β − 1. By Lemma 6, C(T ) ≤ 2α(n− 1). Hence, the PoA of ne
trees of Γ is at most 2 for β ≥ 4.
In the case of β = 3, either diam(T ) ≤ 3 or diam(T ) = 4. In the first case
C(T ) = α(n − 1) and in the second there is u with diamT (u) = 2 = β − 1 and
we can use Lemma 6.
Finally, we consider the case β = 2. Notice that the unique tree T with
diameter 3 is a double star, a graph that is formed by connecting the centers of
two stars. Assume that a ne tree T is formed by Tu, a star with center u, and
Tv, a star graph with center v, joined by the edge (u, v). Let Lu (Lv) be the
set of leaves in Tu (Tv). As T is a ne graph we have that w(Lu), w(Lv) ≤ α.
Furthermore
C(T ) =α(n− 1) +
∑
w∈Lu
w(Lv) +
∑
w∈Lv
w(Lu) ≤ α(n− 1) +
∑
w∈Lu
α+
∑
w∈Lv
α
≤ α(n− 1) + α(n− 2) ≤ 2α(n− 1).
Note that in a ne tree T , if α > wmax, for an edge {u, v} connecting a leaf
u, it must be the case that v ∈ Su. Then, in the proof of Proposition 9, we only
have the case u1 ∈ Su. In such case diam(T ) ≤ β. Hence, if α > wmax, the PoA
on ne trees is 1.
Corollary 4. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a star celebrity game such that
α > wmax. For any ne tree of Γ , diam(T ) ≤ β and therefore the PoA on ne
trees is 1.
To tighten the upper bound let us analyze the properties of the ne trees with
diameter β + 1
Lemma 7. Let T be a ne tree of Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 having diam(T ) =
β + 1, for some β ≥ 3. Let P = u, u1, . . . , uβ , v be a diametral path in T and let
S be a ne such that T = G[S]. We have that
1. u and v are leaves of T .
2. Su = Sv = ∅.
3. w(u) = w(v) = α.
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4. P is the unique diametral path in T .
Proof. Statement 1 follows from the fact that T is a tree with diameter β + 1.
To prove the second statement, assume that Su 6= ∅. As u is a leaf it must
be the case that Su = {u1}. Consider the strategy S′u = {u2}. Taking into
account that dT (u2, v) = β − 1 and that the tree rooted at u2 after deleting
(u, u1) and (u2, u3) has depth at most 2, we have that ∆(S−u, S
′
u) ≤ −w(v) < 0.
Contradicting the fact that T is a ne tree. A symmetric argument shows that
Sv = ∅.
To prove the third statement we consider two cases.
Case 1: w(u) > α. Let S′v = {u1}, then ∆(S−v, S
′
v) ≤ α − w(u) < 0. Thus T
could not be a ne.
Case 2: w(u) < α. By 2 we know that Su = Sv = ∅, therefore u ∈ Su1 . Taking
S′u1 = Su1 \ {u1} we have ∆(S−u1 , S
′
u1) ≤ w(u) − α < 0. Again S could not be
a ne.
We conclude that w(u) = α. A symmetric argument shows that w(v) = α.
To prove the last statement assume that T has two diametral paths with
length β+1. Let u, v, u′, v′ be four vertexes such that d(u, v) = d(u′, v′) = β+1.
We consider two cases.
Case 1: the four vertexes are different. Let P be the shortest path from u to v
and P ′ the shortest path from u′ to v′. Let us first show that P and P ′ must
share at least one point. Otherwise let y be the vertex in P that is closest to P ′
and let x be the vertex in P ′ that is closest to y. By construction P ′ lies in the
subtree rooted at y after removing the edges in P , thus d(y, x) > 0. Therefore,
max{d(u, y), d(y, v)} + d(x, y) + max{d(u′, x), d(x, v′)} > β + 1. Contradicting
the fact that T has diameter β + 1.
Thus P and P ′ share at least one point. Let x(y) be the vertex common to P
and P ′ that is closer to u(v). If there is only one common point x = y. Observe
that when x = y it must happen that x is the central point of both paths, that
is β + 1 must be even and d(u, x) = d(v, x) = d(u′x) = d(v′x) = (β + 1)/2.
When x 6= y assume without loss of generality that u′ is the vertex in the
subtree rooted at x after removing P . In such a case, d(u′, x) = d(u, x) ≤
(β + 1)/2 and d(v, y) = d(v′, y) ≤ (β + 1)/2 as otherwise the tree will not
have diameter β + 1. Thus d(u, v′) = β + 1. By 2 we know that Su = ∅ and by
3 that w(v) = w(v′) = α. Consider the strategy profile, S′u = {y}. We have that
δ(S−u, S
′
u) ≤ α− w(v) − w(v
′) < 0. Therefore T cannot be a ne.
Case 2: two vertexes are the same. Without loss of generality assume that u′ = u.
Let y be the branching point of the paths from u to v and u to v′. As in the
previous case, we have that d(y, v) = d(y, v′) ≤ (β+1)/2. Considering S′u = {y}
we have again that δ(S−u, S
′
u) ≤ α − w(v) − w(v
′) < 0. Therefore T cannot be
a ne.
We conclude that there are only two vertexes at distance β + 1 in T .
Putting all together we get an upper bound on the PoA on ne trees when
β 6= 2.
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Theorem 4. The PoA on ne trees of a star celebrity game with β ≥ 3 and n
players is at most 1 + 2n−1 .
Proof. For ne trees with diameter ≤ β the social cost is α(n − 1) but for ne
with diameter β + 1, by Lemma 7, the social cost is α(n− 1) + 2α. As a star is
an optimal graph with social cost α(n− 1) the claim follows.
α w1 w2 α
α w1 w2 α
Fig. 2. The ne trees with diameter 3
For the case β = 2 it remains to analyze whether a double star can be a ne
for a star celebrity game.
Lemma 8. Let T be a ne tree of a star celebrity game Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉
let β = 2. There is no ne tree for Γ with diameter 3 except when |V | = 4 and
at least two players have weight α.
Proof. Assume that a double star T is formed by two starts Tu and Tv with
centers u and v respectively and the edge {u, v}. Let Lu (Lv) be the set of
leaves in Tu (Tv). Let S be a ne so that T = G[S]. As T is a ne we know that
w(Lu), w(Lv) ≤ α, otherwise by connecting a leaf to the other center their cost
will decrease.
Assume that |Lu|, |Lv| ≥ 2. We have that, for a leaf x, w(x) < α. So, u ∈ Sx,
for x ∈ Lu, and v ∈ Sy, for y ∈ Lv. Otherwise, u (or v) would benefit by
disconnecting to their leaves. For any leaf x ∈ Lu (y ∈ Lv), consider the strategy
S′x = {v} (S
′
y = {u}). For x ∈ Lu, we have ∆(S−x, S
′
x) = w(Lu) − w(x) −
w(Lv) ≥ 0, that is w(x) ≤ w(Lu) − w(Lv). For y ∈ Lv, we have ∆(S−y, S
′
y) =
w(Lv)−w(y)−w(Lu) ≥ 0, thus w(y) ≤ w(Lv)−w(Lu). Which is impossible as
the node weights are positive. Therefore |Lu| = 1 or |Lv| = 1.
Let us assume w.l.o.g that Lu = {x}. If w(x) < α and x ∈ Su, ∆(Su, ∅) =
w(x) − α < 0, which is not possible. Therefore, u ∈ Sx. But in such a case
∆(S−x, {v}) = −w(Lv) < 0. So, w(x) = α.
If |Lv| > 1, let y ∈ Lv. As w(Lv) ≤ α and w(y) > 0, we have w(y) < α.
Therefore, v ∈ Sy, but then
∆(S−y, {u}) = −w(x) + w(Lv)− w(y) = −α+ w(Lv)− w(y) < 0.
Contradicting that S is a ne. Thus, Lv = {y} and, as for the case Lu = {x}, we
can conclude that w(y) = α.
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The unique graph satisfying all conditions is a path on 4 vertexes. Further-
more the leaf nodes must have weight α and there are no restrictions for the
weights of the internal vertexes. It is easy to see that the unique orientations
producing a ne in this particular case are the ones depicted in Figure 2.
Theorem 5. The PoA on ne trees of star celebrity games is ≤ 5/3 and there
are games for which a ne tree has cost 5 opt/3.
Proof. For β ≥ 3 and n ≥ 4, the PoA on ne trees is at most 1 + 2n−1 ≤ 5/3,
by Theorem 4. For β ≥ 3 and n < 4, all trees have diameter at most β, so
the PoA on ne trees is 1. For β = 2 according to Lemma 8 all ne trees have
diameter at most β except for P3 in some cases. When P3 is a ne we have that
C(P3) = 3α + 2α = 5α, giving the upper bound. As there are games for which
P3 is a ne (see Figure 2), the claim follows.
8 Celebrity games for β = 1
Let us now analyze the case β = 1. Observe that every player u for each non-
adjacent node v pays wv, and for each adjacent node pays either α if he has
bought the link, or 0, otherwise. Notice that if u establishes the link (u, v), only
the node v will take profit of this decision. Contrasting with this, when β > 1, if
player u pays a new link, then all the nodes that get closer to u but not farther
than β, will take advantage of this new link.
This particular behavior allows us to show that computing a best response
becomes a tractable problem. Furthermore, the structure of ne and opt graphs
is quite different from the case of β > 1 and we can obtain a tight bound for the
PoA.
Proposition 10. The problem of computing a best response of a player to a
strategy profile in celebrity games is polynomial time solvable when β = 1.
Proof. Let S be a strategy profile of Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, 1〉 and let u ∈ V .
Consider another strategy profile S′ = (S−u, S
′
u), for some S
′
u ⊆ V \ {u}. As
β = 1 we have
cu(S
′) = α|S′u|+
∑
v/∈S′u
wv.
Note that, when |S′u| = k, the first component of the cost is the same and thus
a best response on strategies with k players can be obtained by taking from S′u
the players with the k-th highest weights. Let S′u(k) be the set of those players
and let Wk = W − w(S′u(k)). Thus cu(S−u, S
′
u(k)) = αk + Wk. To obtain a
best response it is enough to compute the value k for which cu((S−u, S
′
u(k)))
is minimum and output S′u(k). Observe that the overall computation can be
performed in polynomial time.
In order to show a bound for the PoA we prove first some auxiliary results.
When β = 1 pairs of vertexes at distance bigger than one correspond to pairs of
vertexes that are not connected by an edge and such a property does not hold
for higher values of β.
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Proposition 11. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, 1〉 be a celebrity game. If G = (V,E)
is a ne graph of Γ , for each u, v ∈ V ,
– if either wu > α or wv > α then {u, v} ∈ E,
– if both wu < α and wv < α then {u, v} /∈ E,
– otherwise the edge {u, v} might or might not belong to E.
Proof. Let S be a ne and let G = G[S] = (V,E). Observe that due to the fact
that β = 1, for any player u,
cu(S) = α|Su|+
∑
{v|v 6=u,{u,v}6∈E}
wv.
The cost is thus expressed in terms of the existence or non existence of a connec-
tion between pairs of nodes and thus the strategy can be analyzed considering
only deviations in which a single edge is added or removed. We analyze the
different cases for players u and v.
Case 1: wu > α. For any player v 6= u, if the edge {u, v} is not present in G
the graph cannot be a ne graph as v improves its cost by connecting to u. For
the same reason, if the edge is present either u ∈ Sv or v ∈ Sv. The latter
casev ∈ Sv, can happen only when wv > α. Therefore, the player that is paying
for the connection will not obtain any benefit by deviating.
Case 2: wu, wv < α. If the edge {u, v} is present in G the graph cannot be a ne
graph as the player establishing the connection improves its cost by removing the
connection to the other player. For the same reason, if the edge is not present
none of the players will obtain any benefit by deviating and paying for the
connection.
Case 3: wu, wv = α. The cost, for any of the players, of establishing the con-
nection or not is the same. In consequence the edge can or cannot be in a ne
graph.
Case 4: wu = α and wv < α. Player v is indifferent to be or not to be connected
to u, but player u in a ne will never include v in its strategy. Observe that again
the edge can or cannot exists in a ne graph but, if it exists, it can only be the
case that u ∈ Sv.
Let us analyze now the structure of the opt graphs.
Proposition 12. Let G = (V,E) be a opt graph of a celebrity game Γ =
〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, 1〉. For any u, v ∈ V , we have
– if wu + wv < α then {u, v} /∈ E,
– if wu + wv > α then {u, v} ∈ E,
– if wu + wv = α then {u, v} might or not be an edge in G.
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Proof. Let S be a strategy profile and let G = G[S] = (V,E) be an opt graph.
As we have seen before as β = 1, for any player u,
cu(S) = α|Su|+
∑
{v|v 6=u,{u,v}6∈E}
wv,
and we get et the following expression for the social cost
C(G) = α|E|+
∑
{u,v|u<v,{u,v}6∈E}
(wu + wv).
The above expression shows that to minimize the contribution to the cost, an
edge {u, v} can be present in the graph only if wu +wv ≥ α and will appear for
sure only when wu + wv > α. Thus the claim follows.
From the previous characterizations we can derive a constant upper bound
for the price of anarchy when β = 1.
Theorem 6. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, 1〉 be a celebrity game. PoA(Γ ) ≤ 2. Fur-
thermore the, ratio among the social cost of the best and the worst ne graphs of
Γ is bounded by 2.
Proof. Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, 1〉. Observe that due to the conditions given in
Propositions 11 and 12 the social cost of an opt graph is
∑
{{u,v}|wu+wv≥α}
α +
∑
{{u,v}|wu+wv<α}
(wu + wv),
and the social cost of a ne graph with minimum number of edges, i.e., one in
which all the optional are not present, is at most
∑
{{u,v}|wu>α or wv>α}
α+
∑
{{u,v}|wu,wv≤α}
(wu + wv) =
=
∑
{{u,v}|wu>α or wv>α}
α
+
∑
{{u,v}|wu,wv≤α and wu+wv=α}
α
+
∑
{{u,v}|wu,wv≤α and wu+wv<α}
(wu + wv)
+
∑
{{u,v}|wu,wv≤α and wu+wv>α}
(wu + wv)
Observe that the difference with the cost of an opt graph is in the last term
D = {{u, v} | wu, wv ≤ α and wu + wv > α}.
Notice that {u, v} ∈ D contributes to the cost of an opt graph with α and to the
cost of a ne graph with wu+wv. By taking Γ with wu = α, for any u ∈ V , we can
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maximize the size of D and this leads to the worst possible ne graph. For such a
Γ , In is a ne graph and we have that C(In) =
∑
u,v∈V,u<v(wu+wv) = αn(n−1).
Furthermore, in any opt graph of Γ , all the edges will be present, thus we have
opt = αn(n− 1)/2. Thus
PoA(Γ ) ≤
n(n− 1)α
αn(n− 1)/2
= 2
Observe that when wu = α, for any u, the complete graph is also a ne graph
and thus we have that the ratio between the social cost of the worst and the
best ne graph is bounded by 2.
Observe that when α < wmin the unique ne is a complete graph which is
also an opt graph. Taking into account that the relationship among celebrity
games and MaxBD games provided in Proposition 8 also holds for β = 1 we can
conclude.
Corollary 5. For β = 1, the PoA and the PoS of MaxBD games and celebrity
games with α < wmin is 1.
9 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have introduced the celebrity games model aiming to address the creation
of networks in a scenario where the nodes or players may have different weights
and where the requirement of being close to a global critical distance has to be
balanced against the node weights. Our results provide further understanding
of the structural properties of stable networks. We have shown that the critical
distance affects directly the diameter of the stable networks. For star celebrity
games the diameter is ≤ 2β+1 and, in the case that the ne graph is not a tree,
the diameter is > β/2. Furthermore, this critical distance, jointly with player
weights and link establishment cost, have implications on the quality of the ne.
We have shown that the PoA of star celebrity games is O(min{n/β,W/α}) and,
for β = 2, we have found games whose PoA is Ω(n). In contra-position restricting
the ne to be trees the PoA is constant.
We can observe that, as one can expect, enlarging the value of the critical
distance improves the quality of equilibria. Furthermore, if the total game weight
W = O(α), the PoA is O(1). Corresponding to the intuition that when player’s
weights are negligible players prefer to be isolated. In contrast, when all the
players are celebrities, even though their weights could be very different, players
prefer to be closer, and the ne graphs have diameter ≤ β. In this latter case,
the upper bound on the PoA obtained in [7] for MaxBD games ameliorates the
upper bound of celebrity games.
It still remains open to shorten the gap between the lower and upper bounds
on the PoA. Our results are only tight for β = 1 and β = 2. The cases where
β is constant are of particular interest. In the family of graphs providing the
lower bound on the PoA not all the nodes are celebrities, so our result has no
implication for MaxBD games.
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Further questions of interest are to study natural variations of our framework.
Among the many possibilities, we propose to analyze celebrity games under (i)
the Max cost model (work in progress), (ii) other definitions of the social cost.
Finally, we have not considered the non uniform version where each player u
can have its own critical distance βu. [7] showed that the PoA of MaxBD game
is Ω(n) even for the non uniform model with only two distance-bound values. As
we have mentioned before such a negative result for MaxBD games translates to
the celebrity games when all the players are celebrities.
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